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The World Economy 
MACROECONOMIC TRENDS 
OVERVIEW 
Recent events have been dominated by a 
major collapse of share pr ices in the 
wor ld ' s s tock markets followed by 
i n s t a b i l i t y in the fo re ign exchange 
markets and a s i g n i f i c a n t downward 
movement in the exchange value of the 
dol lar . By the end of the f i r s t week of 
November, the stock markets in London, 
Frankfurt, New York and Tokyo had fal len 
by 32%, 30%, 25% and 15%, respectively, 
since the middle of October. Uncertainty 
about the at tempts to cut the US Budget 
de f i c i t , the course of the dol lar and the 
future of the Louvre accord on exchange 
ra te s t a b i l i s a t i o n , continued to have a 
depressing effect on share prices. While 
the depressing effects on trade and growth 
in the world economy of a once-and-for-all 
f a l l in share prices of t h i s magnitude 
should be limited and not of recessionary 
proportions, continued uncertainty could 
seriously damage bus iness confidence 
making a major recession more likely. 
In the second quarter of 1987, industrial 
production in the OECD countries rose by 
1.2%, compared with a 0.5% increase during 
the f i r s t quarter of the year. West 
German production rose by 2.9%, reversing 
the r educ t ions of the two previous 
q u a r t e r s , whi le Japanese product ion 
remained unchanged. The US, I ta ly and 
the UK continued to experience posi t ive 
ra tes of growth returning ra tes of 1.1%, 
1.8% and 0.7%, respectively. In the 
twelve months to June, OECD production was 
3.1% higher, with US production rising by 
4.5% (to August), Japanese production 
increasing by 3.9% (to July) and West 
German production fa l l ing by 3.6% (to 
J u l y ) . The o ther major i n d u s t r i a l 
economies a l l experienced positive growth 
over the year to June, with Canada (to 
J u l y ) , France, I t a l y , and the UK ( to 
July), increasing production by 4.1%, 
2.8%, 1.1%, and 3.7%, respectively. 
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Key developments in the t h r ee main 
i n d u s t r i a l economies during the l a s t 
quarter were as follows: 
United States 
Before the collapse in share prices the 
outlook for the US economy was relatively 
favourable. Provisional figures for real 
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GNP showed tha t i t was growing a t an 
annual ra te of 3.8% in the thi rd quarter , 
compared with an annual ra te of 2.5% and 
4.1? in the second and f i r s t quar ters , 
respectively. The wealth effect of the 
share price fal l is expected to reduce the 
growth of GNP during 1988 by about one 
percentage point, with the result that the 
outturn i s l ike ly to be 2.5% rather than 
the 3.5% forecast by the Administration 
before the stock market upheaval. 
The trade and current account of the 
balance of payments continues to show 
l i t t l e improvement , d e s p i t e the 
substantial fal l of the dollar against the 
Yen, D-mark and other major currencies. 
During 1986, the US cu r r en t account 
deficit reached US$140.6bn, US$23bn worse 
than in 1985. In the f i r s t quarter of 
1987, a deficit of US$36.8bn was recorded, 
US$3bn and US$11bn worse than in the f i r s t 
quarters of 1986 and 1985, respectively. 
A further deter iora t ion occurred in the 
second q u a r t e r of the year when the 
def ic i t rose to US$41.1bn, US$6.7bn and 
US$10.7bn, worse than in the second 
quarters of 1986 and 1985, respectively. 
The narrower merchandise trade balance 
reached a de f i c i t of US$16.5m in July, 
having deteriorated in successive months 
since March. But in August there was a 
s l i g h t f a l l in the t r ade d e f i c i t to 
US$15.7bn and the provisional figures for 
September show a fu r the r f a l l to 
US$14.1bn. Trade volumes are beginning 
to move in favour of the US. For 
example, during the f i r s t six months of 
the year the volume of exports grew at an 
annual ra te of 14%, but with the dol lar 
continuing to decline the effect on the 
current account of the improvement in net 
export volumes has been swamped by a terms 
of trade effect . Nevertheless, if the 
dollar does stabilise within the next few 
months and if the f a l l in share prices 
r a i s e s the s av ing r a t i o , then an 
improvement in the current account should 
be clearly evident by the second or third 
quarter of next year. 
Retail prices rose by 0.5% in August to a 
level 4.3% above the level in August 1986. 
Despite the view of the Administration 
that inf la t ion was peaking, the recent 
figures do give some cause for concern. 
The August Commentary reported that many 
economists in the US expected the rate of 
increase to moderate in the second half of 
the year owing to smaller increases in 
food and energy pr ices . However, in 
August a small f a l l in food prices was 
offset by r i s ing energy prices. On the 
basis of the August increase, inflation is 
running at an annual rate of 5.8%. While 
consumer expenditure growth is expected to 
moderate following the wealth effects of 
the f a l l in equity prices thus rel ieving 
some of the inflat ionary pressures, the 
recent sharp f a l l in the dol lar coupled 
with the prospect of fu r the r d o l l a r 
d e p r e c i a t i o n makes the outlook for 
inflation less than sanguine. 
At the time of writ ing i t appears that 
Congress and the Adminis t ra t ion are 
nearing agreement on the nature and scale 
of measures to reduce the Budget deficit. 
If no agreement i s reached by 20 November 
then under the revised Gramm-Rudman-
Hol l ins (GRH) Budget reform, law an 
automatic across-the-board cut of US$23bn 
wi l l be imposed. The original 1985 GRH 
Budget reform law specified a target of 
US$108bn for fiscal year 1988 which began 
on 1 October of t h i s year. The new 
Budget b i l l submitted by Congress and 
recently signed by the President revised 
the GRH de f i c i t t a rge t s , rais ing the 
targets for 1988 and 1989 to US$144bn and 
US$136bn, respectively. Thus the target 
for 1989 has been raised by a substantial 
amount - US$64bn. Official projections 
suggest that in the absence of cuts the 
deficit for the 1988 financial year wil be 
in the range US$163bn to US$179bn compared 
w i t h US$148bn in 1987. And t h e 
projection for 1989 is of a deficit in the 
range USl80bn to US$21 Obn. I t i s c lear 
that even if greater cuts than US$23bn are 
agreed the de f i c i t wi l l s t i l l remain at 
high levels for several years. However, 
i t i s by no means cer ta in that a rapid 
r a t e of contraction of the de f ic i t would 
be b e n e f i c i a l t o t he US economy. 
Swingeing cuts might help business and 
financial confidence but they could also 
precipitate a major recession in the US in 
the absence of r e f l a t i o n a r y measures 
e l s e w h e r e in t he world economy, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y in Germany and Japan. 
Moreover, i t i s worth noting tha t while 
the nominal value of the de f ic i t only 
peaked in f i sca l 1986, the r a t io of the 
de f i c i t to US GNP peaked in 1983 at 6.3%. 
By f iscal 1987 the de f i c i t had fal len to 
3.4% of GNP and on current projections, 
including the GRH cuts , the de f i c i t wi l l 
f a l l to 3.1% and 2% of GNP in 1980 and 
1990, respectively. These proportions 
are l i t t l e different from the average in 
the seven major indust r ia l countries. 
Nevertheless, the significance of the US 
Budget de f i c i t i s tha t i t i s associated 
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with a very low saving r a t i o in the 
country as a whole and i t i s the resulting 
net savings shor t fa l l tha t has produced 
the large external deficit. 
Japan 
During 1986, real GNP growth in Japan fel l 
to 2.3%, compared with 5.1? in 1984 and 
4.7% in 1985. The slow-down in the 
growth of the Japanese economy was largely 
due to the deflat ionary effects of the 
s i g n i f i c a n t a p p r e c i a t i o n of the Yen 
against the dol lar since January 1985. 
In the f i r s t quarter of 1987 real GNP rose 
by 1.3?, equivalent to an annual ra te of 
5.3%. However, in the second quarter of 
the year real GNP f e l l very s l igh t ly . 
Over the year as a whole, rea l GNP was 
2.3% higher by the second quarter compared 
with a 3.8% increase to the f i r s t quarter. 
The slowing down of growth in the second 
q u a r t e r appears to suppor t the view 
reported in the August Commentary, that 
growth would be lower in the remainder of 
the year owing to the unwinding of the J-
cu rve e f f e c t s of t h e h i g h e r Yen. 
Nevertheless, domestic demand appears to 
be fairly buoyant. According to Japan's 
Chain Stores Association, r e t a i l sales 
were 6.4% higher in September than a year 
e a r l i e r , the l a rges t increase recorded 
since July 1981. Indus t r ia l production 
was 4.7% higher in September compared with 
the same period in 1986 having exhibited 
an upward trend since July of t h i s year. 
The recent sharp f a l l in share pr ices i s 
expected to have l i t t l e impact on consumer 
spending since in Japan equi t ies account 
for only a smal l p ropor t ion of the 
financial assets held by individuals. 
Following the appreciation of the Yen, 
export volumes declined and import volumes 
increased. However, in 1986, these 
volume changes were small compared with 
the extent of the Yen's appreciation. 
The s u r p l u s on c u r r e n t a c c o u n t 
consequently rose to US$25.7bn in the 
fourth quar ter , resul t ing in a record 
overall surplus of US$85.8bn for the year. 
In the successive years 1983 to 1986 the 
surplus has been as follows: US$20.8bn, 
US$35bn, US$49.2bn, and US$85.8bn. In 
the f i r s t wuarter of 1987, the surplus 
f e l l to US$21bn but that represented an 
increase of US$8.3 over the f i rs t quarter 
of 1986. In the second q u a r t e r , the 
surplusrose to US$22.8bn but this time the 
quar te r ' s f igures represented a s l igh t 
reduction on the same quarter a year ago. 
Since July the surplus has been fa l l ing , 
reaching US$5.3bn in August compared with 
US$7.1bn in August 1986. How quickly the 
surplus continues to decline depends on 
the importance of the terms of trade 
effects of the recent further appreciation 
of the Yen, the rate of growth of domestic 
demand, the success of Japanese exporters 
in adopting s t ra teg ies to cope with the 
high Yen, and the difficulties encountered 
by foreign exporters in penetrating the 
Japanese market. 
The US$25.4bn package of public spending 
and tax cuts announced in l a t e May, the 
bulk of which was expected to be 
implemented in the current financial year, 
i s s t i l l considered by many analysts to be 
an insuff ic ient s t imulus to domest ic 
demand. I t i s considered by some that to 
stimulate demand by an amount sufficient 
to reduce the current account surplus 
significantly would require a package a t 
least twice as large as that introduced in 
the summer. The budget for the 1988-89 
fiscal year i s currently being compiled so 
i t remains to be seen whether Mr 
Takeshita, Japan's new Prime Minister, 
w i l l be w i l l i n g t o adop t a more 
e x p a n s i o n a r y s t r a t e g y than h i s 
predecessor. 
West Geraany 
The German economy continues to perform 
slugglishly. During 1986, r e a l GNP 
increased by 2.4%, below the government's 
target of 3-3.5% and s l igh t ly down on the 
ra te achieved in 1985. In the f i r s t and 
second quarters of 1987, real GNP fe l l by 
0.8%, then rose by 1.1%. While the 
growth in the second quarter suggests an 
annual rate of growth of 4.4$ this i s only 
because performance was so poor in the 
f i r s t quarter due to the effects of a 
severe winter. So, for example, between 
the second quarters of 1986 and 1987, real 
GNP rose by only 0.8%. In January, the 
government was forecasting real GNP growth 
fo r 1987 of 2.5%, b u t t h e OECD 
subsequently forecast an outturn of 1.5$ 
for the year. The most recent forecast 
by the country's f ive leading economic 
research i n s t i t u t e s , suggests that real 
GNP wi l l grow by 1.75% t h i s year r i s ing 
s l ight ly to 2$ in 1988. However, these 
forecasts assume that the D-mark wi l l 
remain re la t ive ly s table and they do not 
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The government has continued to re jec t 
ca l l s to further st imulate the economy. 
Short-term rates actually rose in October 
in an attempt to check an overshooting of 
money supply growth ta rge t s . But some 
downward movement was again allowed as the 
Bundesbank sought to i nc rease market 
l iquid i ty following the f a l l in equity 
pr ices . Tax cuts of DM14bn and DM20bn 
are planned for 1988 and 1990. A 
rescheduling of the planned 1990 cuts 
forward to 1989 continues to be unlikely. 
Both money supply growth and the budget 
de f i c i t are l ike ly to r i se further, the 
l a t t e r due to the s t agna t ion of tax 
revenues following low economic growth. 
In these c i r cums tances , given the 
author i t ies abhorrence of inf la t ion, a 
further relaxation of the monetary and 
fiscal stance appears unlikely. 
LABOUR MARKET 
Standardised ra tes of unemployment have 
not been published by the OECD for the 
aggregate of member countries since the 
fourth quarter of 1986. The series i s no 
longer being updated pending receipt of 
new data based on EEC Labour Force 
Surveys. However, on the basis of the 
data that are available for key countries 
i t appears that unemployment fel l slightly 
during the second quarter of 1987. The 
US standardised unemployment rate fe l l , on 
rev ised f i g u r e s , from 6.9$ to 6.41, 
fa l l ing further to 5.956 by August of th i s 
year. Japan's unemployment rose by one 
tenth of a percentage point, from 2.9$ to 
3$, but had fal len to 2.7? by July of th i s 
year. West Germany's rate increased, on 
revised figures, from 2.8$ to 2.9$ and had 
r i s e n to 7$ by Ju ly . S i m i l a r l y , 
unemployment in France rose again from 
10.9$ to 11$. In contrast, Canada's rate 
f e l l from 9.6$ to 9$, while in the UK the 
rate fell from 10.7$ to 10.3$. 
PROGNOSIS 
Recent events have been dominated by a 
major collapse of share prices in the 
world 's s tock markets followed by 
i n s t a b i l i t y in the foreign exchange 
markets and a s i g n i f i c a n t downward 
movement in the exchange value of the 
dollar. Current estimates of the impact 
on world economic growth suggest that if 
markets stabilise growth in 1988 will be 
lower but probably by no more than a 
half to one percentage point. However, 
uncertainty about the attempts to cut the 
US Budget de f ic i t , the course of the 
dollar and the future of the Louvre accord 
on exchange ra te s tabi l i sa t ion , continue 
to have a depressing effect on the world's 
financial markets. The outturn for the 
world economy over the coming year depends 
allow for the depress ing e f f e c t s of 
further D-mark appreciation or a downturn 
in the US economy. 
Consumers' expendi ture cont inues to 
provide the main contribution to economic 
growth but i s expected to increase by only 
3$ th i s year compared with 4$ in 1986. 
Investment spending i s weak and i s 
expected to grow by no more than 2$ th i s 
year , and according to the research 
i n s t i t u t e s by only 1$. Indeed the OECD 
contends that the low ra te of investment 
spending i s primarily responsible for 
Germany's continuing net savings surplus 
and hence the persistence of the surplus 
on current account. In 1986, the in i t ia l 
J-curve effects of the appreciating D-mark 
and lower oil and commodity prices led to 
the current account surplus r is ing to 
DM80.6bn compared with DM44.5bn in 1985. 
These effects were sufficient to outweigh 
in the short run the adjustment that was 
beginning to occur in external trade. 
Export volumes f e l l by 0.4$ and import 
volumes rose by 3.5$ during 1986. By 
this summer import volumes were 6$ higher 
than in the same period in 1986 and export 
volumes were stagnating. Nevertheless, 
with further strengthening of the D-mark 
against the dol lar the current account 
surplus i s expected to reduce only slowly 
this year and next. By the end of August 
the current account surplus stood at 
DM46.6bn suggesting a surplus of DM70bn 
for the year as a whole. The f ive 
leading research in s t i t u t e s predict that 
the surplus wi l l be DM75bn th is year, 
falling only slightly to DM65bn in 1988. 
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very largely on events in the US and 
whether the US, Japan and West Germany can 
re-establish a co-ordinated policy to deal 
with the structural imbalances. 
In the US, the continuation of the twin 
s t ruc tura l problems of a large budget 
deficit and the deficit on current account 
has been largely responsible for the 
recent stock market collapse. However, 
while the expected reduc t ion in US 
domestic demand following the wealth 
effects of lower equity prices will lower 
US and world economic growth next year i t 
may also have a favourable impact on the 
s t ruc tura l problems of the US economy. 
F i r s t , there should be a reduction in 
i n f l a t i o n a r y p r e s s u r e s . Secondly, 
domestic savings should increase i f the 
r i s e in the saving r a t i o , as individuals 
seek to r e b u i l t t he i r wealth holdings, 
more than offsets the reduction in saving 
as national income f a l l s . And, if as 
expected, investment decl ines, t h i s in 
turn w i l l reduce the domestic savings 
shor t fa l l resul t ing from the high US 
Budget deficit which, as noted in previous 
Commentaries, has been the root cause of 
the de f i c i t on current account. The 
d i f f icu l ty i s tha t we cannot be cer ta in 
whether recent events are not the prelude 
to a major recession in the US. And this 
uncertainty i s compounded by an apparent 
paradox. The avoidance of a recession 
depends c r u c i a l l y on how se r i ous ly 
business confidence wi l l be affected by 
recent events. Yet to maintain and 
r e s t o r e bus ines s confidence the US 
administrat ion may have to take act ions 
which could in themselves p rec ip i t a te a 
recession. 
Business conf idence, in the form of 
inves tment i n t e n t i o n s and p lanned 
consumption, may be seriously affected for 
two reasons. F i r s t , i f further share 
price fa l ls are anticipated then this may 
gene ra t e a ' g r e a t c rash ' psychology 
s i m i l a r t o , and p a r t l y through an 
awareness of, the post 1929 experience. 
S e c o n d l y , i f b o t h t h e Reagan 
administration and Congress are seen to be 
failing to devise an appropriate policy to 
deal with the Budget deficit then business 
confidence could very easily deteriorate. 
L i t t l e can be done to prevent the 
emergence of a 'great crash1 psychology 
except for the authorities to continue to 
ensure t h a t monetary cond i t i ons are 
s u f f i c i e n t l y re laxed to avoid the 
pressures on l i qu id i ty as the f a l l in 
equity prices raises the demand for money. 
In principle, i t would be fairly easy for 
the US au thor i t i es to res tore confidence 
by introducing measures to gradually cut 
the Budget de f i c i t and reduce domestic 
demand without precipitat ing a recession 
which would in any case ra ise the Budget 
deficit. Once such measures were clearly 
signalled i t would then be po l i t i c a l l y 
easier for both West Germany and Japan to 
expand demand in their own economies. This 
in turn would help the US current account 
de f i c i t thereby l imi t ing the necessary 
deflation of US domestic demand. The 
l ike ly outcome would be that the dol lar 
would s t a b i l i s e , prospects of higher US 
i n f l a t i o n would d imin i sh , h igher US 
in t e re s t r a tes would be avoided and the 
problems faced by highly indebted Third 
World c o u n t r i e s would be e a s e d . 
Moreover, in the face of such a co-
ord ina ted pol icy i t i s l i k e l y t h a t 
business confidence would be very quickly 
restored. Unfortunately, at the time of 
writ ing the prospects of greater co-
ordination on these substantive matters 
appear fairly remote. The US appears to 
be threatening to l e t the dol lar f a l l 
further in an attempt to induce West 
Germany and Japan to expand domestic 
demand. West Germany and Japan appear 
unlikely to take further steps to expand 
the i r economies unless and unt i l the US 
takes positive steps to reduce i t s Budget 
deficit. But with an election next year 
the US administration i s wary of reducing 
domestic demand by an amount that may 
p r e c i p i t a t e a r eces s ion j u s t as the 
e lec tora te goes to the pol ls . A policy 
of l e t t i ng the dol lar f a l l may therefore 
appear to the US administration to be an 
easier option both on economic as well as 
political grounds: a falling dollar would 
direct recessionary pressures elsewhere in 
the world economy. However, i f tha t 
policy were to be adopted there i s no 
guarantee that business confidence in the 
US would be maintained and so a US 
domestic r eces s ion may s t i l l be the 
result . 
I t appears tha t in the absence of a co-
ord ina ted pol icy the p rospec t s of a 
recession in the US, Western Europe and 
Japan are considerable. The interests of 
Western Europe and Japan will therefore be 
b e s t s e rved by t h e a d o p t i o n of 
reflationary measures irrespective of the 
policies adopted or not adopted in the US. 
Moreover, if Japan and West Germany, in 
particular, do stimulate the i r economies 
i t i s more probable that the US will adopt 
the pol ic ies that other countries have 
been urging for so long. 
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